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Division Spotlight
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
The mission of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Division (NNPD) is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology while simultaneously preventing the diversion and misuse of nuclear material and technology through appropriate safeguards and security, and promotion of nuclear nonproliferation policies. To achieve this mission, the objectives of the NNPD are to: Promote policy that discourages the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to inappropriate entities. Provide information to ANS members, the technical community at large, opinion leaders, and decision makers to improve their understanding of nuclear nonproliferation issues. Become a recognized technical resource on nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security issues. Serve as the integration and coordination body for nuclear nonproliferation activities for the ANS. Work cooperatively with other ANS divisions to achieve these objective nonproliferation policies.
Meeting Spotlight
Conference on Nuclear Training and Education: A Biennial International Forum (CONTE 2025)
February 3–6, 2025
Amelia Island, FL|Omni Amelia Island Resort
Standards Program
The Standards Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of voluntary consensus standards that address the design, analysis, and operation of components, systems, and facilities related to the application of nuclear science and technology. Find out What’s New, check out the Standards Store, or Get Involved today!
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Christmas Night
Twas the night before Christmas when all through the houseNo electrons were flowing through even my mouse.
All devices were plugged in by the chimney with careWith the hope that St. Nikola Tesla would share.
Andrew T. Bopp, Weston M. Stacey
Nuclear Technology | Volume 200 | Number 3 | December 2017 | Pages 250-268
Technical Paper | doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2017.1374088
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
A customized dynamic safety model is developed and used to analyze the safety characteristics of the Subcritical Advanced Burner Reactor (SABR), a fast transmutation reactor driven by a tokamak fusion neutron source. Loss-of-flow accidents (LOFAs), loss–of–heat sink accidents (LOHSAs), and loss-of-power accidents (LOPAs) are analyzed taking into account the effects of feedback mechanisms, control rod insertion, and terminating electrical power to the neutron source. The core avoids fuel melting and coolant boiling without corrective action for 50% (failure of one of two pumps) loss of heat sink (LOHSA) and loss of flow (LOFA). For 100% (failure of both pumps) LOFAs, LOHSAs, and LOPAs without corrective action, coolant boiling (1156 K)/fuel melting (1473 K) occur at about 25 s/36 s, 35 s/84 s, and 25 s/36 s, respectively, after pump failure unless corrective control action is taken before this time, in which case the core power can be reduced to the decay heat level by shutting off the plasma power source. The present passive heat removal system is not sufficient to remove the decay heat, and both fuel melting and coolant boiling ultimately occur in the 100% LOFAs and LOHSAs (failure of both pumps) in either the primary or secondary system indicating the need to provide other means for decay heat removal.
