ANS is committed to advancing, fostering, and promoting the development and application of nuclear sciences and technologies to benefit society.
Explore the many uses for nuclear science and its impact on energy, the environment, healthcare, food, and more.
Division Spotlight
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
The mission of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Division (NNPD) is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology while simultaneously preventing the diversion and misuse of nuclear material and technology through appropriate safeguards and security, and promotion of nuclear nonproliferation policies. To achieve this mission, the objectives of the NNPD are to: Promote policy that discourages the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to inappropriate entities. Provide information to ANS members, the technical community at large, opinion leaders, and decision makers to improve their understanding of nuclear nonproliferation issues. Become a recognized technical resource on nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security issues. Serve as the integration and coordination body for nuclear nonproliferation activities for the ANS. Work cooperatively with other ANS divisions to achieve these objective nonproliferation policies.
Meeting Spotlight
Utility Working Conference and Vendor Technology Expo (UWC 2024)
August 4–7, 2024
Marco Island, FL|JW Marriott Marco Island
Standards Program
The Standards Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of voluntary consensus standards that address the design, analysis, and operation of components, systems, and facilities related to the application of nuclear science and technology. Find out What’s New, check out the Standards Store, or Get Involved today!
Latest Magazine Issues
Jul 2024
Jan 2024
Latest Journal Issues
Nuclear Science and Engineering
August 2024
Nuclear Technology
Fusion Science and Technology
Latest News
Vogtle-3 shuts down for valve issue
One of the new Vogtle units in Georgia was shut down unexpectedly on Monday last week for a valve issue that has since been investigated and repaired. According to multiple local news outlets, Georgia Power reported on July 17 that Unit 3 was back in service.
Southern Company spokesperson Jacob Hawkins confirmed that Vogtle-3 went off line at 9:25 p.m. local time on July 8 “due to lowering water levels in the steam generators caused by a valve issue on one of the three main feedwater pumps.”
I Ming Huang, Yuh Ming Ferng, Shih Jen Wang
Nuclear Technology | Volume 160 | Number 3 | December 2007 | Pages 294-307
Technical Paper | Reactor Safety | doi.org/10.13182/NT07-A3900
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
The severe accident management guideline (SAMG) was developed and implemented at the Kuosheng nuclear power plant (NPP) in Taiwan at the end of 2003. The Kuosheng NPP is a Mark-III boiling water reactor (BWR)-6 located in the north of Taiwan. The SAMG of the Kuosheng NPP is developed based on the BWR Owners Group Emergency Procedure and Severe Accident Guidelines. In this paper, MELCOR 1.8.5 is used to investigate the effectiveness of the Kuosheng SAMG and to analyze the reactor coolant system (RCS) bleed-and-feed strategy in a postulated station blackout (SBO) accident since this accident is a dominant sequence that can induce core damage. These simulation results can be applied for the typical BWR-6 NPPs. Based on the simulation results, the major events of an SBO accident without any operator actions, including core uncovery, cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, fuel relocation, vessel failure, and containment failure, are well presented. The RCS bleed-and-feed strategy can cool down the hot core and bring the vessel into the stable condition in the SBO accident with high-pressure core spray injection according to the Kuosheng SAMG. The reactor pressure vessel depressurization before the reactor liquid level reaches one-fourth of the core liquid level can prevent damage to the core fuel. However, the water temperature of the suppression pool will reach saturation temperature, and the containment pressure may challenge the containment integrity. These phenomena were not considered while developing the SAMG.