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The mission of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Division (NNPD) is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology while simultaneously preventing the diversion and misuse of nuclear material and technology through appropriate safeguards and security, and promotion of nuclear nonproliferation policies. To achieve this mission, the objectives of the NNPD are to: Promote policy that discourages the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to inappropriate entities. Provide information to ANS members, the technical community at large, opinion leaders, and decision makers to improve their understanding of nuclear nonproliferation issues. Become a recognized technical resource on nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security issues. Serve as the integration and coordination body for nuclear nonproliferation activities for the ANS. Work cooperatively with other ANS divisions to achieve these objective nonproliferation policies.
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The busyness of the nuclear fuel supply chain
Ken Petersenpresident@ans.org
With all that is happening in the industry these days, the nuclear fuel supply chain is still a hot topic. The Russian assault in Ukraine continues to upend the “where” and “how” of attaining nuclear fuel—and it has also motivated U.S. legislators to act.
Two years into the Russian war with Ukraine, things are different. The Inflation Reduction Act was passed in 2022, authorizing $700 million in funding to support production of high-assay low-enriched uranium in the United States. Meanwhile, the Department of Energy this January issued a $500 million request for proposals to stimulate new HALEU production. The Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024 includes $2.7 billion in funding for new uranium enrichment production. This funding was diverted from the Civil Nuclear Credits program and will only be released if there is a ban on importing Russian uranium into the United States—which could happen by the time this column is published, as legislation that bans Russian uranium has passed the House as of this writing and is headed for the Senate. Also being considered is legislation that would sanction Russian uranium. Alternatively, the Biden-Harris administration may choose to ban Russian uranium without legislation in order to obtain access to the $2.7 billion in funding.
Lili Tong, Jie Zou, Jun Tao, Xuewu Cao
Nuclear Technology | Volume 191 | Number 1 | July 2015 | Pages 15-26
Technical Paper | Thermal Hydraulics | doi.org/10.13182/NT14-93
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
In the advanced passive pressurized water reactor, a passive containment cooling system (PCCS) has been adopted to cool the containment—comprising a cylindrical steel vessel—during postulated accidents, whereby the decay heat is removed through water film evaporating enhanced by air cooling outside the containment. In this study, an integrated safety analytical code is used to study the heat removal capacity of PCCS during severe accidents and its influence on severe accident management measures. The coupled analytical model includes the reactor cooling system, engineered safety features, containment system, and PCCS. Containment responses during typical design-basis accidents and integrated severe accident scenarios are calculated and validated using a design control document and probabilistic risk assessment, respectively. Four typical severe accident sequences that contribute to core damage frequency or containment high pressure are selected to evaluate the containment response. The results show that the containment pressure can be controlled at a relatively low level within 72 h with the heat removal by PCCS. Analysis of the effects of PCCS water cooling recovery during the late period of the accident sequence in severe accident management guidelines alerts as to the risk of hydrogen combustion after breaking the steam-inert atmosphere inside containment. Moreover, sensitivity analysis has been performed to study the influence of the water film coverage rate and environmental air temperature, and it shows that a decrease of the water film coverage rate and an increase of the environmental air temperature reduce the PCCS cooling capacity.