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Division Spotlight
Reactor Physics
The division's objectives are to promote the advancement of knowledge and understanding of the fundamental physical phenomena characterizing nuclear reactors and other nuclear systems. The division encourages research and disseminates information through meetings and publications. Areas of technical interest include nuclear data, particle interactions and transport, reactor and nuclear systems analysis, methods, design, validation and operating experience and standards. The Wigner Award heads the awards program.
Meeting Spotlight
Conference on Nuclear Training and Education: A Biennial International Forum (CONTE 2025)
February 3–6, 2025
Amelia Island, FL|Omni Amelia Island Resort
Standards Program
The Standards Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of voluntary consensus standards that address the design, analysis, and operation of components, systems, and facilities related to the application of nuclear science and technology. Find out What’s New, check out the Standards Store, or Get Involved today!
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Nuclear Science and Engineering
February 2025
Nuclear Technology
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Latest News
Reboot: Nuclear needs a success . . . anywhere
The media have gleefully resurrected the language of a past nuclear renaissance. Beyond the hype and PR, many people in the nuclear community are taking a more measured view of conditions that could lead to new construction: data center demand, the proliferation of new reactor designs and start-ups, and the sudden ascendance of nuclear energy as the power source everyone wants—or wants to talk about.
Once built, large nuclear reactors can provide clean power for at least 80 years—outlasting 10 to 20 presidential administrations. Smaller reactors can provide heat and power outputs tailored to an end user’s needs. With all the new attention, are we any closer to getting past persistent supply chain and workforce issues and building these new plants? And what will the election of Donald Trump to a second term as president mean for nuclear?
As usual, there are more questions than answers, and most come down to money. Several developers are engaging with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or have already applied for a license, certification, or permit. But designs without paying customers won’t get built. So where are the customers, and what will it take for them to commit?
R. C. Lloyd, S. W. Heaberlin, E. D. Clayton, R. D. Carter
Nuclear Technology | Volume 42 | Number 1 | January 1979 | Pages 13-21
Technical Paper | Reactor | doi.org/10.13182/NT79-A32158
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
A study was made of 100 violations of criticality safety specifications reported over a 10-yr period in the operations of fuel reprocessing plants. The seriousness of each rule violation was evaluated by assigning it a severity index value. The underlying causes, or reasons, for the violations were identified. A criticality event tree was constructed using the parameters, causes, and reasons found in the analysis of the infractions. The event tree provides a means for visualizing the paths to an accidental criticality. Some 65% of the violations were caused by misinterpretation on the part of the operator, being attributed to a lack of clarity in the specification and insufficient training; 33% were attributed to lack of care, whereas only 2% were caused by mechanical failure. A fault tree was constructed by assembling the events that could contribute to an accident. With suitable data on the probabilities of contributing events, the probability of the accident’s occurrence can be forecast. Estimated probabilities for criticality were made, based on the limited data available, that in this case indicate a minimum time span of 244 yr of plant operation per accident ranging up to ∼3000 yr subject to the various underlying assumptions made. Some general suggestions for improvement are formulated based on the cases studied. Although conclusions for other plants may differ in detail, the general method of analysis and the fault tree logic should prove applicable.