The implications of a nuclear power industry in a large nuclear war in the year 2000 were examined from the standpoints of (a) target value of reactors, (b) consequences for nearby population, and (c) long-term consequences of adding reactor fission products to the fallout from the weapons. The primary conclusion is that fallout augmentation by targeting nuclear reactors is of marginal military or strategic value. With the anticipated missile guidance accuracy by the year 2000, it mill be feasible to excavate all reactors and high-level liquid waste tanks, and add those fission products to the fallout. However, the augmented fallout is not intense enough for long-term interdiction of strategic amounts of transportation or food production capacity under probable emergency standards for radiation exposure. On the basis of contribution to gross national product, 2400-MW(e) nuclear or fossil-fueled power plants are competitive targets compared to the rest of the economy for 1-Mton warheads, and isolated 1000-MW(e) plants are competitive targets for 125-kt warheads, given the estimated size of the USSR strategic force. If the U.S. adopts a USSR-style civil defense plan, casualties from direct weapon effects on reactors will be largely avoided, and the principal effect of fallout augmentation over that caused by the attack alone would be doubling the 90Sr contamination on essential grain-growing areas. In the population near nuclear power reactors, fatalities from the release of radioactive aerosols from damaged reactors can be essentially eliminated by the use of expedient respiratory protection by the population downwind of the damaged reactor. The potential dose-commitment from the attack alone is estimated to cause in the U.S. an increase of 30% in the cancer death rate. However, this increase in death rate would not show up for more than a decade after the attack. Fallout augmentation from cratering reactors and high-level waste tanks could result in doubling the delayed cancer death rate if (a) the USSR is willing to spend an additional 400 to 600 warheads to produce this effect, and (b) fission product wastes are retained in surface or near-surface storage for 10 y after reprocessing.