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Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
The mission of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Division (NNPD) is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology while simultaneously preventing the diversion and misuse of nuclear material and technology through appropriate safeguards and security, and promotion of nuclear nonproliferation policies. To achieve this mission, the objectives of the NNPD are to: Promote policy that discourages the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to inappropriate entities. Provide information to ANS members, the technical community at large, opinion leaders, and decision makers to improve their understanding of nuclear nonproliferation issues. Become a recognized technical resource on nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security issues. Serve as the integration and coordination body for nuclear nonproliferation activities for the ANS. Work cooperatively with other ANS divisions to achieve these objective nonproliferation policies.
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General Kenneth Nichols and the Manhattan Project
Nichols
The Oak Ridger has published the latest in a series of articles about General Kenneth D. Nichols, the Manhattan Project, and the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. The series has been produced by Nichols’ grandniece Barbara Rogers Scollin and Oak Ridge (Tenn.) city historian David Ray Smith. Gen. Nichols (1907–2000) was the district engineer for the Manhattan Engineer District during the Manhattan Project.
As Smith and Scollin explain, Nichols “had supervision of the research and development connected with, and the design, construction, and operation of, all plants required to produce plutonium-239 and uranium-235, including the construction of the towns of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Richland, Washington. The responsibility of his position was massive as he oversaw a workforce of both military and civilian personnel of approximately 125,000; his Oak Ridge office became the center of the wartime atomic energy’s activities.”
B. C. Johnson, G. E. Apostolakis, R. Denning
Nuclear Technology | Volume 172 | Number 2 | November 2010 | Pages 108-119
Technical Paper | Reactor Safety | doi.org/10.13182/NT10-A10898
Articles are hosted by Taylor and Francis Online.
We consider the design of a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) in the context of the risk-informed technology neutral framework (TNF) for licensing new reactors that has been proposed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff. In lieu of design-basis accidents (DBAs), the TNF imposes limits on the frequency and consequences of accident sequences called licensing-basis events (LBEs). We present a method to define LBEs for a SFR using generic functional event trees. Very large consequence events are considered beyond the licensing basis in the TNF as long as their mean frequencies are less than 1 × 10-7 per reactor year.For SFRs, energetic accidents have historically represented a major regulatory hurdle in the traditional licensing system that is based on DBAs. As a result, key systems that prevent or mitigate these accidents may have been overdesigned. We propose a new importance measure, the Limit Exceedance Factor (LEF). It is the factor by which the failure probability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) may be multiplied such that the frequency of a risk metric reaches a limit. LEF allows a designer to know how much margin exists to the safety limit for each SSC. Alternatively, in the case where a design does not meet the frequency limit, LEF can reveal which systems are candidates for improvement to satisfy the limit. Within the TNF, using a frequency limit of 1 × 10-7 per reactor year and LEF, we find that for some SSCs a wide margin exists to this limit. Therefore, these SSCs are candidates for simplification resulting in economic benefit. This simplification should be done under the frequency-consequence constraints and the deterministic defense-in-depth requirements described in the TNF.