Who Would Sell Enrichment Technology To The Middle East?

The United States, in particular, has been active in encouraging emerging nuclear states to import their fuel rather than create it domestically. While a few countries without nuclear weapons-Brazil, Germany, Japan, and The Netherlands-have invested in enrichment without much fanfare, the intense sensitivity to Iran's program suggests that dual-use nuclear technology in areas with regional instability will likely cause international backlash.

As a result, Middle Eastern states in particular will face difficulties securing enrichment or reprocessing technology from abroad. In part, this is because the United States has empirically been successful in requiring its trade partners "to undertake a legal commitment to forswear enrichment and reprocessing technology," as a Center for Strategic and International Studies report detailed; this so-called "gold standard" model was used, for example, in the United States' nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates that allowed the Emirates to begin a nuclear power program. In addition, the report finds that diplomacy, sanctions, and other export controls have so far proved "reasonably effective" in preventing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. While the gold standard is a signature of U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements, the United States has been pushing for its allies to adopt this model, and there has been some receptivity to the idea of enforcing the standard in the Middle East.

For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a conglomerate of almost all nations involved in the production of nuclear energy components, has already come up with a list of parts crucial to the enrichment process that it will not sell to any Middle Eastern state (although it is worth noting that adhering to the decisions of the NSG is up to the respective governments of the organization's member countries). Nevertheless, these countries are largely not interested in aggravating the United States and other major powers, which put stock in the NSG to act as a bulwark of the global nonproliferation regime.

Even the countries that are not part of the NSG are unlikely to be the cause of dual-use nuclear exports. The countries participating in the NSG include every country with a nuclear energy program except India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, Armenia, Iran, and Taiwan. Israel and Iran are unlikely to transfer technology within the Middle East because of regional competition. Israel is not transparent about its own nuclear technology; it would not want to embolden its potential regional adversaries, and is it not likely to enter any nuclear partnership without the agreement of its key ally, the United States. Iran also has concerns about the nuclear ambitions of its regional adversaries, like Saudi Arabia, and even when it comes to the nation's allies, Iran may not be willing to engage in nuclear adventurism at the risk of further sanctions. Armenia and Taiwan are not viable exporters due to the size of their nuclear programs and the foreign origins of their nuclear designs.

That leaves only India, Pakistan, and North Korea as potential concerns. But India and Pakistan are not part of the NSG largely because of their intrastate competition. India actually wants in to the group, a move that the United States and the United Kingdom have been supportive. As long as this is a goal for India, the country is unlikely to violate the guidelines that NSG suppliers are bound to follow. Furthermore, while India is considering entering the nuclear export market, it has currently not exported any power generation equipment, although it has engaged in some small-scale technology transfers. Also, India uses heavy-water reactors, which Middle Eastern countries have shown little interest in, and it normally collaborates with Russia for nuclear energy construction, even on domestic projects. Should India seek a major contract, it would likely then be in collaboration with Russia, which is party to the NSG.

Problematically, neither Pakistan nor North Korea is reliably responsive to U.S. interests. That's a kind overstatement in the case of the DPRK, which in 2007 provided components to Syria to build a nuclear reactor, although Israel shattered the project in bombings later that year. However, the country simply doesn't have the money to fund a big export project. Although Pyongyang has continued to aggravate even the countries giving it much-needed aid, there is a chance it would think twice about nuclear exports because of the likely consequences. It is similarly improbable that-as some have proposed-Pakistan would be willing to sell a weapon whole. North Korea's arsenal is small, with only 6-8 weapons, and it is valuable for the country's leadership. The country also does not have a strong capacity to build additional weapons, since the reactor used to extract plutonium is not operated consistently.

One might expect that limiting the nuclear exports of Pakistan to be easier than with Pyongyang because of its (albeit tenuous) alliance with the United States, except that Saudi Arabia essentially financed Pakistan's current nuclear infrastructure and, in turn, the country has somewhat expressed a willingness to provide Saudi Arabia with reactor parts, or even a whole nuclear weapon. But Pakistan has a very small arsenal, at 100-120 weapons, and these weapons are a source of national pride and came at a very high cost. This suggests that leaders would be unlikely to give up part of their arsenal or would only do so at almost prohibitively high costs. In addition, the country is currently working to improve its global status with regard to nuclear issues, especially after facing blowback from A.Q. Khan's illicit trafficking network. Also, Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia has noticeably cooled, especially when it comes to military affairs; Islamabad said no in 2015 to Riyadh's request to join an anti-Iran alliance and to contribute to its fight in Yemen. Pakistan also probably doesn't want to anger the neighboring Iran, which views Saudi Arabia as a rival for regional hegemony.

For its part, Saudi Arabia has yet to capitalize on its nuclear relationship with Pakistan, and the Saudi security relationship with the United States gives it an additional incentive not to go down this path. Experts have concluded that "no hard evidence has emerged to prove that Saudi Arabia is interested in purchasing nuclear weapons from Pakistan." Meanwhile, Pakistan's relations with other regional states are not sufficiently strong for the country to risk its relationship with the United States.

With Pakistan and North Korea as unrealistic possibilities for nuclear technology transfer, it seems that most exporters will be sensitive to risks that nuclear development poses. The international perception that what is currently touted as peaceful nuclear development in the Middle East could one day become a military concern is fostered by the unclear motives of Iran as well as the vocal concerns of Israel and the United States about nuclear developments elsewhere in the region. States considering exporting nuclear technology to the area must contend with these international fears of nuclear weapons proliferation.

The UAE's case demonstrates the principle that nuclear exports to the Middle East can only occur under tight restrictions. International analysts had concluded that the UAE was a potential nuclear weapons proliferation risk, largely because of its historical associations with the A.Q. Khan network. It was only when the UAE passed regulations on dual-use technology and indicated that it would be willing to accept the United States' gold standard conditions that nuclear technology suppliers took the country's interest in a nuclear power plant seriously. The United States will continue to try to apply similar provisions to future technology transfers in the region-both to maintain the credibility of the agreement with the UAE and because of prevalent concerns about regional proliferation.

Lauren Sukin is an editor and researcher at The Century Foundation. She studies political science at Brown University.