SMR prospects in the developing world

Proponents of SMRs contend that one can install multiple units at a single site and common resources—such as office space, site security, control room, and waste management facilities—would improve the economics of the overall nuclear power plant (NPP). They also note that construction of the units can be staggered so that capital expenditures for construction can be spread over time. The first one or two could be constructed quickly, and revenue from the sale of electricity could be used to finance the construction of later units.

Other advantages of SMRs include the provision of steady baseline power, the ability to ramp up and down relatively quickly for better integration with intermittent sources of electricity (compared with traditional reactors), and the incorporation of improved inherent and passive safety and security features into their designs (also in comparison with traditional reactors).

Another belief is that, due to improved safety features and smaller radionuclide inventories, emergency planning zones around SMRs should be smaller than those around traditional reactors. Therefore they could be constructed closer to population centers than traditional large reactors. Also, because of their small capacity, SMRs would be easier to integrate into the electrical grid in areas that lack high-capacity transmission systems.

Besides generating electricity, other applications of SMRs, particularly of those that are cooled with liquid metal and gas, include chemical processing, desalination, hydrogen production, and district heating. Some SMR designs require less frequent refueling than large reactors (up to 20 years versus 1.5 to 2 years), whereas some very small SMRs, called microreactors, do not require refueling at all for their entire lifetime.

Opponents of SMRs, on the other hand, contend that many of the issues with the existing traditional nuclear reactors also afflict the small, modular variety. For example, the heretofore unresolved issue surrounding the disposition of spent nuclear fuel affects all reactors, regardless of size—and may even be more serious for some SMR designs that utilize fuels with higher enrichments and different chemical compositions than traditional reactor fuels. Opponents also argue that, even though the source terms (the inventory of radionuclides that would be released to the environment in an accident) and the probability of accidents occurring at an SMR could be less, the risk of having a catastrophic accident with concomitant health and economic consequences would still be unacceptable. Further, the delays that have occurred during the licensing and construction of large plants are also likely to occur with SMRs, thus affecting the economics of these plants similarly.

SMRs for nuclear newcomers

I have spent enough time teaching and traveling in various developing countries in Africa and Asia to know that most of these nations have many challenges when it comes to basic necessities such as energy, health care, and education. They need to balance the resources necessary for the development of a nuclear power program with the resources needed to effectively use the energy generated by nuclear reactors for their economic development and well-being of their citizens.

There is considerable interest in deploying SMRs among nuclear newcomer countries in the developing world to produce reliable and climate-friendly energy—and there are many reasons SMRs would be a good fit in these regions.

Electrical transmission and distribution systems in many developing countries are not large enough and stable enough to integrate a traditional NPP but could handle an SMR. As a reliable and steady source of power, SMRs are easier to integrate with intermittent sources of energy, such as wind and solar, compared with traditional NPPs. They are easier to site, economically less challenging, support climate mitigation goals, and have several potential nonelectric applications that would assist infrastructure development.

But how? The BOOD model

There are a few approaches available to developing countries looking to incorporate SMRs into their energy mix. But the best option in the long term for all parties involved, I believe, is the BOOD—or, build, own, operate, decommission—model, where a consortium of vendors and investors, with support from the country that supplies the SMR, is responsible for financing, building, operating, and decommissioning the reactor, as well as supplying fresh fuel and taking back the spent fuel. The newcomer country would purchase the electricity (and/or heat, fresh water, hydrogen, etc.) produced by the SMR and manage the low-level waste generated by the SMR.

Below are the key points of the model, which can be suited to land-based plants but would work particularly well for floating NPPs:

The entire NPP is built on a specially designed ship or barge and is moved to an offshore location in the host country. For a land-based plant, the SMR components would be shipped to the host country and assembled on-site by the vendor.

When it is time to refuel or refurbish, the entire NPP (for a floating plant) or the nuclear island (for a site on land) is replaced with another unit, and the old one is hauled away to vendor/operator’s location.

The host country sets up the distribution system for the energy produced by the NPP and agrees to purchase this energy at a predetermined price.

The vendor/operator is responsible for transportation in international waters and the safety of the NPP at the location.

An agreement is put in place between the vendor/operator and the host country for physical security and emergency preparedness and response while the SMR is stationed in the host country.

Under the BOOD model, nuclear newcomers would be able to devote a higher percentage of their resources to better utilization of the energy produced by SMRs (e.g., in agriculture and industry), thereby increasing their economic well-being. However, vendors/investors will need to make significant up-front investments, so newcomer countries will need to put mechanisms in place to demonstrate that the SMR vendors/investors will be able to recover their investments via the sale of energy.

In order to finance SMR builds in newcomer countries, vendors (including the reactor vendor and the suppliers of key components of the NPP, such as the reactor pressure vessel, steam generator, pumps, turbine, and electric generator) and investors could form a consortium that owns the overseas SMRs with the backing of the government of the reactor vendor country. The consortium could also be the operator of NPPs employing the SMR design, or they can hire an experienced outside operator. I have called this entity the owner/operator. Additionally, the following conditions would have to be satisfied:

The SMR design must be approved by the appropriate regulatory authority in the country of origin.

An international organization, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, must review the SMR design and provide a report on the condition and suitability of the design for international use.

An agreement must be signed between the host country and the vendor/operator spelling out the terms of the BOOD, including how some liabilities and safeguards responsibilities will be shared between the two parties.

The agreement must be overseen by an international organization, such as the World Trade Organization.

The host country must conduct the necessary environmental assessments and obtain the necessary environmental certification for the intended site.

A designated agency in the host country, in coordination with the vendor/operator, must oversee the process of obtaining other necessary permits (e.g., air quality, land use, water use, noise, etc.).

This model presents certain advantages for each party: the host country, the vendor/operator, and the developed country where the reactor vendor is located. The host country does not have to worry about fuel availability or management of spent nuclear fuel. It also shares liability, safety, security, and safeguards workload with the vendor/operator, which helps ease the transition into using nuclear power.

For the vendor/operator, the BOOD model is likely to result in higher numbers of SMRs being built to achieve economy of numbers faster. In addition, having a single continuous ownership of the SMRs built in different countries and locations would result in better utilization of resources in the vendor/operator’s own country. Lessons learned from earlier SMRs can be applied toward future builds, and the parts removed or replaced from the operating SMRs can be recycled or disposed of more effectively. In addition, the transportation of SMRs already loaded with fuel in international waters is likely to require coordination with and approval by various national and international maritime organizations. It would be advantageous to have a single owner in the vendor’s country that manages these activities.

Developed countries, particularly the nuclear-weapon-state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in my opinion, have not been nearly as forthcoming in helping the nonnuclear-­weapon-state parties to the NPT in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as they have been in the area of safeguards. Surely, they are the primary sponsors of IAEA activities intended to help the developing countries to establish their nuclear power program infrastructures, but I don’t think it is enough. These countries should stop viewing the specific nuclear power plant projects intended for peaceful purposes in developing countries merely as business enterprises. They should also take them as opportunities for partial fulfillment of their obligations under the NPT and the Paris Agreement, if they are signatories to the agreement and have not pulled out.

Developed countries in general and the United States in particular have spent tremendous amounts of resources, for both military applications and for commercial use, since the beginning of the nuclear era about 80 years ago to be at the point they are today. They are still expending considerable resources for research and development for military and commercial use, often with cross-cutting applications. Given the scarcity of resources and competing demands for resources in various sectors of government in most nuclear newcomer nations, it is not realistic to expect these countries to become self-sufficient owner/operators of SMRs in 10–15 years, as assumed by the IAEA’s Milestones Approach for development of newcomer countries’ nuclear power programs. With all the complexities in the design, operation, and transportation of SMRs as well as new fuel types being proposed, it is almost guaranteed that developing countries will need a lot of help from vendor countries to operate and maintain their first SMRs and to manage the spent nuclear fuel, if they end up owning their SMRs. Under the BOOD model as proposed here, these countries can obtain the benefits of reliable and climate-friendly nuclear energy, gradually increase their contributions and capacity over time, and then finally, considering the economic factors and legal constraints, they can attain more self-sufficiency in the nuclear enterprise.

Halil Avci is retired from Argonne National Laboratory and is a part-time consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency.